

11 June 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: NSSM-95

1. The NSSM-95 drafting committee, chaired by Jonathan Moore, had its first meeting at 1130 on Thursday, 11 June. Other members are Lindsay Grant (NSC Staff), Michael Armacost (State, Policy Coordination Staff, former White House fellow, Moore's amanuensis), Dennis Doolin (ISA), Admiral Epes (JCS) and myself.

2. Our task will not be easy. Exhibit A in support of this contention is the attached copy of the draft outline Moore tabled. As you will note, it starts with the unexamined premise that the over-riding objective of U.S. Indochina policy is to run, not walk, for the exit. Admiral Epes hardly knew what to say and hence kept largely silent. I asked if this was really what we meant to say. My question produced considerable hemming and hawing, but it clearly is what Messrs. Moore, Doolin and (apparently) Grant want to say. If the group continues to operate from this premise, writing a paper properly responsive to NSSM-95 (which has quite a different premise) is going to be one of the week's neater tricks.

3. Incidentally, from Moore's premise, much else flows -- including State's whole behaviour and policy pitch re Cambodia and Laos since 18 March.

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Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment  
GACarver:jal:11June70

cc: Mr. Karamessines

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- 1 - NSSM-95 w/att
- ✓ 1 - GAC Chrono w/att
- 1 - VAS Chrono w/att
- 1 - Memos TO and FROM DCI w/att

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DRAFT OUTLINE - NSSM 95

I. Purpose

II. U.S. Interests and Objectives in Indochina

1) Continuation of an orderly and responsible withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from South Vietnam. This interest encompasses the following subsidiary interests: (A) The protection of U.S. forces remaining in SVN during the withdrawal process and a reduction of casualties to a minimum; (B) concentration of ARVN forces upon the tasks of pacification and local security in the heavily populated provinces of the III and IV where alone a South Vietnamese government can achieve durable results in establishing its authority; (C) negotiation of a settlement of the war consistent with the principle of self-determination which would permit a faster withdrawal of U.S. troops, and the release of U.S. POW's.

2) Insofar as it affects the achievement of American objectives in Vietnam, deny the NVA/VC forces unimpeded use of sanctuaries along the Cambodian-SVN border from which they may launch attacks on U.S. troops and the South Vietnamese population. This suggests the subsidiary interests of: (A) increasing the costs to the NVA/VC of

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using the border areas without attempting to exert continuing control there; (B) enhancing Cambodia's capacity to defend its independence and neutrality without transforming the GOC into an active belligerent in the Indochinese War; (C) preventing, if this can be achieved at reasonable cost to other interests, the replacement of the present Cambodian Government by a communist government prepared to allow Cambodia to become a vast sanctuary and staging base for attacks on South Vietnam. Conversely, we have an interest in avoiding the investment of U.S. prestige in the survival of the present GOC or any successor that may emerge; (D) impeding the flow of men and supplies being introduced into South Vietnam through Southern Laos and Northeast Cambodia.

3) Limiting the political influence and avoiding direct military intervention by the Soviet Union and China in Southeast Asia. This implies an interest in avoiding actions which may provoke the Chinese to step up their support for insurgent activities in Northeast Thailand or expand their military presence in Laos; stimulate a greater convergence in the policies of China, Russia and North Vietnam in SEA; or increase the dependence of Hanoi on the support of those larger Communist powers.

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4) Preventing both the historic animosities among the non-communist states of mainland SEA and their desire that the U.S. increase rather than reduce its involvement from hampering U.S. efforts to accomplish an orderly military disengagement from SVN. Stated more positively, we have an interest in: (A) the assumption by non-communist states in Indochina of an increasing measure of self-help and self-reliance; (B) greater mutual cooperation among and shifting the responsibility of regional security to the states of the region; (C) the kind of regional cooperation among non-communist states which will help protect our assets in Vietnam without engaging us in additional commitments or rendering those we now have more liable to be called to account.

III. Policy Alternatives → insert (5) from next page (3/4)

1) Should U.S. offer additional support directly or through other countries to the present GOC? This includes the following actions: (A) minimum presence (DATT attached only to Embassy, no MAAG, no AID mission, small intelligence group) and modest program of military and economic assistance; (B) minimum U.S. presence in Phnom Penh, but larger scale military assistance channeled through other countries, principally South Vietnam and Thailand; and (C) expanded U.S. presence (DATT assigned

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5) Managing the process of disengagement of U.S. forces from South Vietnam without disrupting domestic tranquility, stimulating the application by Congress of rigid restrictions on U.S. foreign policy, and encouraging a public climate of opinion that indiscriminately opposes any and all foreign interventions, thus truly damaging the credibility of U.S. commitments. This would imply, for example, the avoidance of actions which will be perceived at home and abroad as extending the geographic scope, prolonging the duration, or increasing the financial, political and human costs of our military effort in mainland SEA.

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to provincial capitals, MAAG, AID mission, enlarged intelligence capability) and substantial military and economic assistance supplied directly by U.S. and other countries.

2) What courses of action are available to the U.S. if the present GOC appears likely to fall, or falls? This includes the following actions: (A) expand various kinds of U.S. support to Lon Nol; (B) offer support to alternate non-communist leader; (C) remain aloof from internal Cambodian political struggle, but reserve right to operate militarily in the border areas and to interdict the enemy from the air; (D) support third country mediation effort to produce a political accommodation among contending forces; (E) if regime is replaced by pro-Hanoi government dependent for survival on NVA/VC, support GVN and RTG efforts to hamper the effective establishment of the new regime's authority and accommodation of Communist military objectives.

3) What kinds of proxy forces, if any, should the U.S. support in Cambodia or Southern Laos? This includes the following actions: (A) support continuing deployment of [REDACTED] in the eastern sanctuary areas; (B) support recruitment, training, and introduction of ethnic Khmer "volunteers" [REDACTED]

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into Cambodia, attached to FANK; (C) support ARVN units in support of GOC; (D) support RTG regular units in border areas of Cambodia in interests of Thai security; (E) support RTG regular units in South Laos and Northern Cambodia to interdict flow of supplies; (F) support deployment of RTG regular troops to support GOC; (G) support deployment of ROK division currently in South Vietnam into Northeast Cambodia.

4) Should the U.S. support a restructuring of the security relationships among the GVN/RTG/GOC/RLG in order to facilitate cooperation and common anti-communist effort against NVN? This includes the following actions: (A) discourage formation of formal multilateral association among non-communist states in Indochina; (B) encourage establishment of regional association but avoid American presence in the association and shun role of coordinator; (C) support fully such an association.

5) What kinds of military operations should the U.S. be prepared to continue or undertake in Cambodia after June 30th? This includes the following actions: (A) "Hot pursuit" across the border; (B) ground reconnaissance and paramilitary operations in border zones; (C) air interdiction in Northeast Cambodia; (D) TACAIR operations in support of FANK.

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